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Abstract 
This article challenges the traditional conception that the right to self-
determination does not require a certain outcome. This article examines 
what restrictions international law imposes on peoples‟ choice to freely 
determine their political status. This article concludes that the right to self-
determination calls for the installment of a form of government which is 
based on the consent of the governed, is substantially representative of all 
distinct groups in the country and respects human rights. Regardless of these 
duties imposed on governments one may only conclude from State practice 
that it is not observed by many States. As such the rise of self-determination 
may not automatically be equated to the rise of democracy. 
A. Introduction 
The existence of the right to self-determination is well established in 
international law.
1
 It evolved from a political principle to a human right, 
codified in several human rights treaties,
2
 and is accepted as a rule of 
customary international law.
3
 Several scholars even argue that the right has 
acquired jus cogens status.
4
 
Despite the prominent status of the right to self-determination within 
various international treaties and instruments and many scholarly writings 
on the subject “no norm has emerged that comprehensively defines the 
scope of the right to self-determination”5. Notwithstanding the differing 
interpretations of the right to self-determination, there does seem to be a 
consensus on the fact that there are two dimensions of self-determination: an 
 
1
 Thomas Franck even traces the principle of self-determination back to 1000 B.C.. See 
T. M. Franck, „The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance‟, 86 American Journal 
of International Law (1992) 1, 46, 53. 
2
 Id., 52-56; H. Hannum, „The Right to Self-Determination in the Twenty-First 
Century‟, 55 Washington and Lee Law Review (1998) 3, 773, 774-775. 
3
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16, 31, para. 52. 
4
 Supporters of this view include I. Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law 7th 
ed. (2008), 553; A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (2005), 65. 
5
 A. Kreuter, „Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of States: Somaliland 
and the Case for Justified Secession‟, 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 
(2010) 2, 363, 367-368. 
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external one and an internal one.
6
 However, no consensus seems to exist on 
the exact relationship between the two. During the Cold War more emphasis 
was put on the external dimension, while currently more attention is being 
paid to the internal meaning.
7
 Although some authors claim that the internal 
meaning has fully supplanted the external meaning,
8
 the majority of scholars 
does seem to accept that the two dimensions coexist.
9
  
The external dimension is said to define the status of a people in 
relation to another people or States, meaning the right to political 
independence from alien domination or an already existing sovereign 
State.
10
 Whether this right applies to minorities and thus includes a right to 
secession from sovereign States is disputed.
11
 The wording in Article 1 
Charter of the United Nations is said to refer to the external dimension.
12
 
The internal dimension is said to concern the relationship between a 
people and its own State or government.
13
 It entails a people‟s choice about 
its governance.
14
 Some authors argue that the internal dimension is 
formulated in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
 
6
 Id., 368-369. 
7
 R. Ezetah, „The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry‟, 22 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law (1996-1997) 3, 495, 504. 
8
 G. H. Fox, „Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?‟, 
16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1994-1995), 733. 
9
 See for example A. E. Eckert, „Free Determination of the Determination to be Free? 
Self-Determination and the Democratic Entitlement‟, 4 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs (1999-2000) 1, 55, 68; R. Ezetah, supra note 7, 
503-504; R. A. Miller, „Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of 
Democracy?‟, 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2002-2003) 3, 601, 617. 
10
 Patrick Thornberry, „The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with 
Some Remarks on Federalism‟, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-
Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle? (1993), 101; A. 
Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995), 5; Ezetah, supra 
note 7, 503-504. 
11
 Fox, supra note 8, 738-739. 
12
 This is supported by Art. 1 (3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) which reads “The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations”; see also Fox, supra note 8, 738-739. 
13
 Cassese, supra note 10, 101; Thornberry, supra note 10, 101. 
14
 Ezetah, supra note 7, 504. 
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Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
15
 Others disagree.
16
 Another 
contested element of the right to self-determination is the definition of 
peoples.
17
 
This paper will examine the scope of the internal dimension of the 
right to self-determination. Article 1 (1) ICCPR and ICESCR states: “All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”18 But what exactly do the Covenants 
entitle peoples to do? Do peoples have the freedom to choose any form of 
government, including a dictatorship? Or does international law impose 
certain restrictions on the peoples‟ choice? 
The international community has historically answered the latter 
question negatively; otherwise, it was argued, one would confuse the 
necessary means, a free determination of political status, with a particular 
end, a determination to be free or democratic. A determination in which 
there can be only one legitimate outcome, democracy, cannot truly be 
considered a free act of self-determination.
19
 
This article will question that statement. Currently, the international 
community already accepts that the right to self-determination is non-
absolute and may be limited by the principle of territorial integrity.
20
 This 
article will argue that international law also imposes at least two other 
limitations and possibly a third one, concluding that the right to self-
determination only contains the right to opt for a certain type of 
government, namely a government that fulfills certain standards. These 
standards are derived from the limitations that will be examined in the 
following paragraphs. 
The two first limitations are explicitly formulated in international law: 
they are the prohibition of racist and segregating regimes, and the 
international obligation to protect human rights. The third limitation is more 
controversial and stems from the emerging entitlement to democratic 
governance. Since the beginning of the 1990s it has been argued by some 
 
15
 Miller, supra note 9, 620; Ezetah, supra note 7, 509. 
16
 Fox, supra note 8, 739; Hannum, supra note 2, 773-777. 
17
 Id., 739; Hannum, supra note 2, 774. 
18
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Art. 1, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; [ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966, Art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]. 
19
 Eckert, supra note 9, 69-70. 
20
 J. Vidmar, „The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of 
the Same Coin?‟, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010) 2, 239. 
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scholars that the internal aspect of self-determination entails “a people‟s 
democratic choice about its governance (emphasis added)”21. As the 
existence and content of a possible right to democratic governance is 
disputed, its ability to possibly limit the exercise of the right to self-
determination is also disputable. The three limitations will be examined 
next. 
B. The International Prohibition of Racist and 
Segregating Regimes 
On two occasions in history the international community has 
explicitly outlawed a political regime, i.e. after World War II the Nazi 
regime and in the 1970s the Apartheid regime. The Nazi regime was called 
by the Nuremberg Tribunal a “complete dictatorship”22. The Nuremberg 
judgment describes in detail how Hitler came to power and how he used and 
maintained it. In addition, the Tribunal criminalized membership in certain 
organizations.
23
 
Hitler‟s political program consisted of twenty-five points, of which the 
following is of particular interest in this context: “Point 1. We demand the 
unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany, on the basis of the right 
of self-determination of peoples”24. This goal was to be achieved through a 
policy of aggressive war. In order to be able to pursue such a policy the 
regime had to gain complete control of the machinery of government. In 
addition to the series of measures aimed at subjecting all branches of 
government to their control, the Nazi Government also took active steps to 
increase its power over the German population.
25
 In the field of education, 
everything was done to ensure that the youth of Germany was brought up in 
the atmosphere of National Socialism and accepted National Socialist 
teachings. The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the nation in support 
of their policies through the extensive use of propaganda. As a result, 
 
21
 Ezetah, supra note 7, 504. Ezetah bases this argument on Thomas Franck‟s 
revolutionary idea that a democratic entitlement is emerging in international law, see 
Franck, supra note 1, 52. 
22
 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
(14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946) available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ 
Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf (last visited 14 June 2010), at 225. 
23
 Id., 12. 
24
 Id., 174. 
25
 Id., 176. 
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independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered quite 
impossible. 
The second, more recent, example of a universal
26
 condemnation of a 
political regime is the Apartheid regime. The crime of Apartheid is defined 
in both the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA)
27
 and in the ICC Statute
28
 
 
26
 It should be noted that “Western” nations have never signed nor ratified the 
International Convention. on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 30 November 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 [ICSPCA]. For a complete list of 
ratifications see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE& 
tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-7&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited 24 
September 2010). However, the crime of Apartheid has been endorsed – albeit in a 
weaker form – in other instruments, for instance in the 1977 First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions (Art. 85, para. 4(c)), Art. 18(f) of the Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which does not mention the word 
“Apartheid”, but refers to “institutionalized racial discrimination” as species of crime 
against humanity and Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
27
 Art. 1 ICSPCA states that “Apartheid is a crime against humanity and inhumane acts 
resulting from the policies and practices of Apartheid and similar policies and 
practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the 
Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a 
serious threat to international peace and security”. Art.2 defines the term “the crime of 
Apartheid”, “which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation 
and discrimination as practiced in Southern Africa [and] shall apply to the following 
inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination 
by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and 
systematically oppressing them: Denial to a member or members of a racial group or 
groups of the right to life and liberty of person: By murder of members of a racial 
group or groups; By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of 
serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by 
subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or 
groups; Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions 
calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part; Any legislative 
measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the 
deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development such a groups or 
groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human 
rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade 
unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right 
to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association; 
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and criminalizes certain acts committed in the context of institutionalized 
regimes of racial segregation and discrimination. Apart from the specific 
situation in South Africa, the crime was used to sanction the political regime 
in South Rhodesia.
29
 The term has also been used by human rights defenders 
and the media with regard to the Israeli occupation of Gaza.
30
 
From this it follows that the right to self-determination cannot be 
understood to include the right to choose a system of Apartheid or a Nazi 
regime. Should peoples opt for such a system, international law would not 
consider it to be legitimate and would possibly subject the system to 
sanctions, as illustrated by the South Africa and South Rhodesia cases.
31
 
 
 Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along 
racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial 
group or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial 
groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or 
members thereof Exploitation of the labor or the members of a racial group or groups, 
in particular by submitting them to forced labor; Persecution of organizations and 
persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose 
Apartheid.” See GA Res. 3068, 30 November 1973. 
28
 Art. 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court states that “„crime against 
humanity‟ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack”. In Art. 7 para. 2(h) the term is further explained: “„The crime of apartheid‟ 
means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, 
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and 
domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed 
with the intention of maintaining that regime”. 
29
 M. S. McDougal & W. M. Reisman, „Rhodesia and the United Nations: The 
Lawfulness of International Concern‟, 62 American Journal of International Law 
(1968) 1, 1. 
30
 See for instance J. Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967, UN Doc A/HRC 
4/17, 29 January 2007; an open letter written by International Solidarity Movement: 
Open letter to Bono: entertaining apartheid Israel… U 2 Bono? available at 
http://palsolidarity.org/2010/01/10627/ (last visited 20 October 2010) and Boycot 
Israel Apartheid Campaign: Tell MEC to Stop Supporting Israeli Apartheid! available 
at http://www.boycottisraeliapartheid.org/node/48 (last visited 9 June 2010). 
31
 Regarding South Africa: The UN Security Council imposed sanctions upon South 
Africa. See for instance SC Res. 311, 4 February 1972, para. 1. The United Nations 
refused to recognize the South African representatives‟ credentials to the UN General 
Assembly in 1974. See GA Res. 3206, (XXIX), 30 September 1974. See also 
A. Barnard, „Slegs Suid Afrikaners – South Africans Only? A Review and Evaluation 
of the International Crime of Apartheid‟, 7 New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law (2009) 2, 317, 335-336. Regarding South Rhodesia: The UN did 
not recognize the regime in Rhodesia as the legitimate government. See for instance 
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C. The Interdependence of Human Rights 
A second limitation flows from the duty under international law on all 
States regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems to respect 
human rights. This obligation is not controversial in principle, as it is 
enshrined in the Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter and in 
Article 6 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. Moreover, 
all States who voluntarily have accepted jurisdiction of a human rights court 
capable of evaluating its human rights record clearly accept the legality of 
the principle; otherwise they would not accept possible conviction when a 
violation has been established. Even States who are not members of regional 
human rights mechanisms or who frequently violate human rights do not 
claim that they are not bound by human rights law. They justify violations 
on alternative grounds. 
Human rights law strives to have States respect all human rights as 
they are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The exercise of one 
human right may not lead to the violation or abolishment of another human 
right. Article 30 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
Article 5 ICCPR and ICESCR state that “[n]othing in this Declaration may 
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth herein”. Consequential, this means that the 
exercise of the right to self-determination may not lead to the violation or 
abolishment of other human rights. 
D. The Emerging Norm of Democratic Governance in 
International Law 
The possible existence of a right to democracy in international law has 
been the subject of fierce debates in several international
32
, regional
33
 and 
 
SC Res. 288, 17 November 1970. See also McDougal & Reisman, supra note 29, 17-
18. 
32
 For the discussion within the United Nations framework see inter alia an Agenda for 
Development, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/48/935, 6 May 1994; 
Human Rights Commission Res. Human Rights U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, 27 
April 1999; for the Inter-Parliamentary Union see the Universal Declaration on 
Democracy (1997). 
33
 The right to democracy has only been explicitly recognized within one region, namely 
by the Organization of American States (OAS). See Art. 1 of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (2001) available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1 
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national
34
 fora. In international scholarship, the idea was first expressed in 
1988 by Professor Henry Steiner, but it was only through Professor Thomas 
Franks‟ article “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” that the 
idea gained fame internationally.
35
 Over the years the notion has been both 
widely supported
36
 and criticized
37
 in the literature. One of the theory‟s 
 
_en_p4.htm (last visited 21 October 2010); Declaration of Nuevo León (2004) 
available at http://www.oas.org/documents/specialsummitmexi 
co/DeclaracionLeon_eng.pdf (last visited 21 October 2010), Draft Declaration of 
Quito on Social Development and Democracy, and the Impact of Corruption (2004) 
available at http://www.oas.org/xxxivga/DeclaracionQuito_eng.pdf (last visited 21 
October 2010). Nevertheless, the issue of democracy has been widely discussed 
within the other regions: for Europe see for instance the OSCE Document of the 
Copenhagen Meeting on the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE 
(1990) available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf (last 
visited 21 October 2010) and the OSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) 
available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf (last visited 21 
October 2010); for Africa see for instance Lomé Declaration (2000) available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/april/ pa/apr7/meeting.htm 
(last visited 21 October 2010), African Union Declaration on the Principles governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa (2002) available at 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/elections/declaration -africa-02.pdf (last 
visited 21 October 2010); for the Arab Region see the Sana‟a Declaration on 
Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court (2004) 
available at http://www.undp.org.ye/reports/Sanaa%20Decleration%20on%20D 
emocracy%20Human%20RIghts%20and%20the%20Role%20of%20the%20Internatio
nal%20Criminal%20Court.pdf (last visited 21 October 2010); for Asia see the Asian 
Charter on Human Rights (1998) available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ASIA,,,4 52678304,0.html (last visited 21 
October 2010) which contains a specific section on the right to democracy. 
34
 The national legal German system is unique because it considers democracy to be an 
individually assertable right: “what is guaranteed to Germans entitled to vote is the 
individually assertable right to participate in the election of the Bundestag and thereby 
to cooperate in the legitimation of state power by the people at federal level and to 
have an influence over its exercise”. Therefore functions and powers of substantial 
importance must remain for the German Bundestag. See Manfred Brunner and Others 
v. The European Union Treaty, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, reprinted in 1 
Common Market Law Report (1994), 57, para. 247 and Judgment of 30 June 2009, 
Cases 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 and 2 
BvR 182/09 available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ 
es20090630_2bve000208en.html (last visited 22 October 2010), paras 40-41. 
35
 H. J. Steiner, „Political Participation as a Human Right‟, 1 Harvard. Human. Rights. 
Yearbook (1988), 77 and T. Franck, supra note 1. 
36
 G. H. Fox and B. R. Roth, „Democracy and International Law‟, 27 Review of 
International Studies (2001) 3, 327; G. H. Fox, „The Right to Political Participation in 
International Law‟, 17 Yale Journal of International Law (1992) 2, 539; Ezetah, supra 
note 7; S. Wheatley, „Democracy and International Law: A European Perspective‟, 
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most contested elements is the formulation of the right and implicitly the 
underlying understanding of the concept of democracy.
38
 
Not only its content is disputed – also its relationship to other human 
rights remains unclear. The definition proposed by most proponents is 
generally deducted from, and connected to, an existing human right, i.e. the 
right to political participation
39
, the right to free and fair elections
40
 or the 
right to self-determination
41
. Support for such a limited approach is said to 
be found in the current state of international law and the current limited 
willingness of the international community to accept a broader concept.
42
 
Such a limited conception is also endorsed in the national German legal 
system.
43
 The choice for a limited conception of (the right to) democracy is 
contested by other authors,
44
 the OAS Inter-Democratic Charter
45
 and the 
 
51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002) 2, 225; C. M. Cerna, 
„Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?‟, 
27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1995) 2, 289; 
J. N. Maogoto, „Democratic Governance: An Emerging Customary Norm?‟, 
5 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review (2003), 55. 
37
 Eckert, supra note 9; N. J. Udombana, „Articulating the Right to Democratic 
Governance in Africa‟, 24 Michigan Journal of International Law (2003) 4, 1209; 
J. Ebersole (reporter), „'National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging 
Norm of Democracy in International Law‟ (panel discussion), 86 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings (1992), 249; Susan Marks, The Riddle of all 
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (2000), 
164. 
38
 See for instance S. Marks, „The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic 
Governance”‟, 91 American Society of International Law Proceedings (1997), 372. 
39
 Steiner, supra note 35. 
40
 Franck, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 36. 
41
 Wheatley, supra note 36; Ezetah, supra note 7. 
42
 R. Burchill, „The EU and European Democracy –Social Democracy or Democracy 
with a Social Dimension?‟, 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2004) 1, 
185, 186. In addition Gregory Fox points out that “elections are something that 
international institutions can be very good at monitoring and evaluating”. See 
Ebersole (reporter), supra note 37, 270. 
43
 See footnote 34. 
44
 Marks, supra note 37; Miller, supra note 9, 608-609. 
45
 Art. 1 Inter-Democratic Charter grants “the peoples of the Americas […] a right to 
democracy” and imposes on “their governments […] an obligation to promote and 
defend it”, however it does not define the right. The Charter does stipulate in Arts 2 
and 3 that democracy should be representative and participatory. As essential elements 
of representative democracy the Charter lists, inter alia, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in their universality, indivisibility and interdependence, access 
to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of 
periodic free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an 
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former United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
46
 who all seem to 
favor a more comprehensive definition of democracy. 
Although international consensus on, and recognition of, the existence 
of a right to democracy in international law might still be considered to be 
premature, let us assume for the purpose of this article that the right to 
democracy exists in international law. Regardless of whether one accepts a 
limited or a more comprehensive definition, it is clear that respect for 
human rights is at the heart of the discussion. 
A consensus does appear to exist on the fact that no single model of 
democracy can exist.
47
 However, the absence of a universal political model 
does not negate universal democracy. Both proponents of broad and limited 
perceptions of democracy consider the legitimation of governance by the 
consent of the governed to be the core element of a democracy. 
Governance is legitimated through political participation which 
includes, but is not limited to free and fair elections. The right to political 
participation is enunciated in both Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 ICCPR. 
Article 25 ICCPR reads “[e]very citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and 
without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. 
 
expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties 
and organizations and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of 
government (see Arts 3 and 7). The constitutional subordination of all state 
institutions to the legally constituted civilian authority and respect for the rule of law 
on the part of all institutions and sectors of society are also mentioned as essential 
elements of democracy (Art. 4). 
46
 Operational para. 2 Commission for Human Rights Res., Human Rights Documents. 
E/CN.4/RES/1999/57, 28 April 1999; stated that “the rights (sic) of democratic 
governance include, inter alia, the following:(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and 
expression, of thought, conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and 
assembly;(b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media;(c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens‟ rights, 
interests and personal security, and fairness in the administration of justice and 
independence of the judiciary;(d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as 
free voting procedures and periodic and free elections;(e) The right of political 
participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; (f) 
Transparent and accountable government institutions;(g) The right of citizens to 
choose their governmental system through constitutional or other democratic 
means;(h) The right to equal access to public service in one‟s own country”. 
47
 This principle has been reaffirmed on multiple occasions by the UN General 
Assembly: preambular para. 7 GA Res. 62/7, 13 December 2007; preambular para. 7 
GA Res. 61/226, 14 March 2007; preambular para. 10 GA Res. 60/253, 2 May 2006. 
Also mentioned in preambular para. 8 GA Res. 55/96, 28 February 2001. 
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Based on Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 ICCPR, a government that 
is not based on the consent of the governed is not considered to be 
legitimate. In addition, the government must be substantially representative 
of all distinct groups in the country.
48
 Representation should be manifest in 
active participation such that “representation and participation [are] 
experienced as part of a continuum.”49 This means that true participation 
goes beyond the initial consent expressed through free and fair elections. 
Consequently, its exercise should continuously be guaranteed. When a State 
precludes effective participation, it also denies its people their right to self-
determination. Acts such as mass electoral fraud, anti-democratic coups, or 
persecution of minority groups constitute violations of a people‟s collective 
rights by which it is ruled.
50
 
As a consequence, the right to self-determination – tempered by the 
core components of universal democracy – only allows opting for a system 
that is based on the consent of the governed and that is substantially 
representative of all distinct groups in the country. Electing any other 
government could be sanctioned by national or international courts, as 
illustrated below. 
As the exercise of one human right may not lead to the violation or 
abolishment of another human right, the exercise of the right to self-
determination may not limit or exclude the future exercise of that right by 
particular groups or individuals. For instance, the right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs includes not only the right to free and fair elections 
but also comprises of the right to participate in the elections as a candidate. 
The right to freedom of association allows for the establishment of political 
parties. However, one may not form any kind of political party. Political 
parties engaging in activities aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms [set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights] may 
 
48
 This follows logically from the wording “everyone has the right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs”. 
49
 Thornberry, supra note 10, 116. 
50
 The true exercise of the right to self-determination supposes a governmental system 
which takes into account the rights of minorities. Pure majoritarianism will by 
definition exclude some citizens from the decision-making process, thus making the 
consultation at the core of self-determination incomplete. Only a theory of democracy 
that takes into account the concerns of all individual components of state-based “self” 
is convincing as a species of self-determination. See Fox, supra note 8, 771. 
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be dissoluted by the government or by a court.
51
 In addition to the cases 
brought before the European Court of Justice, a similar event has taken 
place in Belgium. On 21 April 2004 the Ghent Court of Appeals found three 
nonprofit organizations in breach of the anti-racism law as they all three 
assisted a political party (“Vlaams Blok”) that had clearly and repeatedly 
committed acts of racism and discrimination. This judgment led to the 
transformation of the “Vlaams Blok” into “Vlaams Belang”.52 
Moreover, election of a non-democratic party may also cause 
international institutions or other States to take sanctions. This question was 
raised within the European Union when Austrian elections in 1999 brought 
the controversial People‟s Party into the government. The EU members felt 
that this was contrary to European values, including the value of democracy, 
and downgraded unilateral relations with Austria. There were calls from 
certain Member States for EU action to be taken but no clear legal action 
under the EU treaties could be taken as there had been no clear violation of 
Article 6 Treaty on the European Union (current Article 2).
53
 It was argued 
that all Austria did was to recognize the results of a free and fair election. At 
the same time it was said, that had the Austrian government engaged in any 
practices which were contrary to established human rights protection, 
questions could have been raised about adherence to the principles of 
Article 6 TEU.
54
 
In conclusion, the exercise of the right to self-determination is 
currently limited by the core components of universal democracy. 
Consequently, the right to self-determination only allows peoples to opt for 
a system that is based on the consent of the governed and that is 
substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country. The reality 
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must however be acknowledged that peoples may opt for a form of 
government violating these components. However, by doing so, such a 
government would expose itself to possible sanctions. 
E. Testing the Hypothesis: The Situation in Iraq 
After the 2003 invasion, the UN Security Council has reaffirmed on 
several occasions “the right of the Iraqi people to freely to determine their 
own political future and control their own natural resources.”55 From the 
wording listed in subsequent resolutions it becomes clear that the Security 
Council imposes the restrictions discussed above on the Iraqi people. The 
Security Council encouraged “the people of Iraq to form a representative 
government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to 
all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender”.56 Another 
paragraph reads “[w]elcoming the commitment of the Transitional 
Government of Iraq to work towards a federal, democratic, pluralistic, and 
unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights”57. 
Finally, the Security Council welcomed “the assumption of full 
governmental authority by the Interim Government of Iraq on 28 June 2004, 
the direct democratic elections of the Transitional National Assembly on 30 
January 2005, the drafting of a new constitution for Iraq and the recent 
approval of the draft constitution by the people of Iraq on 15 October 
2005”58. 
The Security Council added to these restrictions that the Government 
has to “play a critical role in continuing to promote national dialogue and 
reconciliation and in shaping the democratic future of Iraq”59. 
This supports the idea argued in the above paragraphs, namely that 
international law calls for the installation of a system of representative 
government that respects human rights and must continue to do so. The 
Security Council also accepts other characteristics of democracy, namely 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for the principle of the rule 
of law. 
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F. Conclusion 
This article examined whether international law imposes certain 
restrictions on the right to self-determination and has come to the conclusion 
that current international law imposes two restrictions on the right to self-
determination, and possibly a future third one. Taken into account these 
limitations, the “internal” right to self-determination calls for the installment 
of a form of government that is based on the consent of the governed, is 
substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country and respects 
human rights. 
As the international law of democracy further develops, in the future a 
third limitation may be imposed, namely respect for the right to democracy. 
This norm‟s currently disputed character makes it very difficult to correctly 
assess its future effect on the right to self-determination. 
Regardless of which definition of the right to democracy the 
international community will adopt in the future it is clear that the respect 
for human rights is at the core of the discussion. Both minimalist and more 
comprehensive conceptions consider the consent of the governed and the 
true representative character of the government to be the core components 
of a democratic government. 
As these two core elements are currently protected under human rights 
law
60
 it may be said that they already influence the exercise of the right to 
self-determination, that is in theory at least. 
As stated above, respect for internal self-determination is a continuous 
process. The international right to self-determination does not end when a 
certain mode of government has been elected. The right to self-
determination imposes on the government a duty to ensure that peoples 
under his jurisdiction have the opportunity to continuously exercise its right 
to self-determination. As such internal self-determination may be considered 
to be the extension of the external right to self-determination. As the choice 
for independence or a certain level of autonomy does not grant the peoples a 
blank check, theoretically the exercise of external self-determination should 
equate to the promotion or expansion of democracy, or at least democracy‟s 
two core elements. Unfortunately history has illustrated that that is not the 
case, for example the creation of numerous post Cold-War States has not 
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dramatically increased the number of democracies, rather it has been said to 
have advanced an undemocratic climate in which ethnic-nationalism has 
blossomed.
61
 
Similarly, any exercise of internal self-determination should respect 
human rights and the core components of democracy in a nation. However, 
in many nations – both democracies and non democracies – which formally 
respect the right to self-determination, the participatory rights of certain 
groups remain very controversial. 
For these reasons the rise of self-determination may not automatically 
be equated to the rise of truly representative and participatory democracy. 
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